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This review will be performed by examining the tenets of the Abrams' doctrine as it was formulated years ago. It will be reviewed historically as to the use of the Army Reserve components as well as its context in today's environment of a long term conflict. The goal is to determine the flexibility and viability of the doctrine to deal with the National Military strategy both now and in the future.
HISTORICAL USE OF THE ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD
Before we explore the issues and importance of the Abrams Doctrine, we must first examine the historical use of the Reserve Components and how that usage was relevant to best understand the influences which shaped the doctrine. Historically, with the exception of the Viet Nam conflict, the Reserve Components have had a major role in every major war or conflict in modern American history. In World War I seventeen of the forty-three Divisions of the American Expeditionary Army, almost forty percent of the combat divisions, were from the Reserve Components. In World War II, of course, the entire nation was mobilized for the war against Japan and the Axis powers of Europe and again the Reserves although one hundred percent mobilized were a major contributing factor. As an example of their usage, eighteen National Guard divisions and twenty six Reserve divisions were part of both the European and Pacific Theaters. These divisions participated in all major campaigns to include General MacArthur's island hopping campaign in the Pacific. While in Europe the Reserve components served in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, the Normandy invasion, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final campaign to conquer Germany.
The next major conflict was the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, when one hundred and thirty-eight thousand six hundred National Guard soldiers and a total of two hundred thousand Reservists' saw action.
2 These soldiers served in every position from Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support with great success. While the Korean War was only a three year conflict, the next major endeavor was the Viet Nam War. This ten year long conflict saw a dramatic change in the utilization of the Reserve Component.
Viet Nam was the first time in modern history that the Reserve components were not a major effort in the total force to fight a war. During the Viet Nam War it is estimated that only three thousand reservists were mobilized and deployed. These numbers reflect the use of only thirty six units from the National Guard, and they were not utilized until after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 five years into the long term conflict. These extremely small numbers comprised less than one percent of the total force of six hundred thousand servicemen who saw action in that ten year conflict.' Of significant importance is the fact that at the same time this major conflict was being conducted the military, especially the Army, had a very large force forward deployed as part of the Cold War deterrence effort in Europe. The results of this lack of use of the Reserves even in their strategic reserve role were to have a major impact on the actions of the man the doctrine is named for, General Creighton Abrams. In order to meet maintain thirteen divisions and with a plan to expand to sixteen divisions to meet the Cold War Threat General Abrams proposed moving authorizations for large numbers of soldiers and units into the National Guard and Reserves. This idea was not only to make the process feasible under the budgetary constraints but also to maintain the viable force that he felt the Army needed to make missions. 9 Furthermore it would help to fix the three areas vital to the 3 Army that General Abrams were lacking during the Viet Nam conflict. To reiterate, these three areas were over utilization of the Active force, the lack of public support for military endeavors, and a ready, relevant Reserve Component.
OVER UTILIZATION OF THE ACTIVE COMPONENT
As the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Abrams was to encounter one of the woes of the Viet Nam era. Over utilization of the Active component caused a major problem with the readiness of the Army. As described by Lewis Sorley, when Abrams took over as Chief only four of the thirteen divisions were combat ready. 10 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF MILITARY ENDEAVORS
Integrating the Reserve components deeply in the Total Force would accomplish another major concern important to General Abrams' vision. This concern was the need and use of public support for military endeavors. This area was severely lacking in Viet Nam when the war effort and specifically the draft became very unpopular with the American public. Two 4 individuals important to the formulation of the Abrams doctrine and also key to its implementation were James Schlesinger and General John Vessey. These two key individuals were quoted in regards to General Abrams' desire to link the Armed Forces to the nation as to assure their proper use and not how they had been utilized in Viet Nam. The first General
Vessey, who would become Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, made two poignant statements as to Abrams' thinking. The first was a response to a question on whether the integrating of the Reserves so deeply in the total force structure would make it difficult for the President of the United States to deploy significant forces without calling up the Reserves? His answer "that is it, without malice aforethought, the whole exercise." He went on to say in his second statement that General Abrams believed the Armed Forces were an expression of the nation they served. " Taking considering, the total added strength of Army National Guard, (350,000) and the Army Reserve (205,000) that amounts to almost one fourth of the entire Army.
As a result of the tremendously high operational tempo it is easy to predict that the Active force could be over utilized in the current conflict of today as well as the future environment.
There are estimates which point out that the typical Active duty soldier in a deployable unit could spend the majority of the next three to four years deployed overseas. Secondly in the area of public support, just as envisioned by the formulators of the Abrams' doctrine, public support is a limiting factor on the civilian chain of command's power.
By enhancing military and civilian connections it is possible to garner public support. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau put it quite succinctly and eloquently, "the country should never go to war ever, at anytime, and any place without the National Guard; because when you call up the Guard you call up every community, every town, school, church, factory and retail store. For families this is huge. That is why this country is so behind our soldiers, because 4 Transformation, while not mentioned in this paper, is expected to directly affect up to 100,000 soldiers and hopefully provide more deployable and expeditionary units. Additionally this new modular force will be affective across all components. While this is certainly a positive change, when combined with the recent authorization for another 30,000 Active Component soldiers, more needs to be done to examine the exact roles of the Reserve Components as well as the Active force. Stability and security missions, as well as peace keeping missions, and homeland defense have sprung to the forefront in the new environment. These type missions require more time abroad or more active duty time by all soldiers especially when the design of a major conflict was that of Operation Desert Storm of the 1 990s which took less than a year.
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have and will continue to stress our Army today, so will major operations in the future. It is essential to the well being of the United States
Army that our doctrine in regards to Total Force policy and the Abrams doctrine come under close scrutiny and examination to assure it will meet the challenge of the 21 St century by being viable and flexible.
In the words of James Jay Carafano, 'junking the policies justified by the Total Force
Concept and the Abrams Doctrine may be a prerequisite for rethinking how the reserves are organized, employed and resourced". programs, benefit plans must be revamped and resourced to increase the capacity of these part time professionals to meet the challenges of the 2 1 St century and help carry out National Security Strategy. That starts with a doctrine on how to best utilize these soldiers and how to integrate them effectively into the National Defense Strategy. The three principle tenets of the Abrams doctrine are still sound in this regard but they need to be updated to reflect our 21 St century Army of a million soldiers with almost twenty-five percent of the force contentiously deployed all around the world in often hostile environments. The civilian chain of command, active and reserve leaders, and elected officials need to take action to study and implement a new doctrine that meets our future challenges in the same manner that they have developed an affinity to respond to soldiers needs in combat.
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